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RESPONSE TO HAROLD KOH’S CHILDRESS LECTURE – A 
UNITED STATES HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 
MICHAEL H. POSNER* 
In his Childress Lecture, Professor Harold Koh sets out to help define 
human rights principles and strategic choices for the U.S. government in this 
era, which he terms the “new age of globalization.”1  He outlines four basic 
principles, which he asserts should be the cornerstone for government officials 
working on international human rights.  These principles are: 
 
1. Telling the truth, 
 
2. Consistency toward the past—promoting accountability mixed with 
reconciliation, 
 
3. Consistency toward the present—and what he terms inside-outside 
engagement, and 
 
4. Consistency toward the future—including early warning, preventive 
diplomacy, the use of force where necessary and building democracy.2 
 
Professor Koh, who played an extraordinary leadership role as the 
Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor in the last two years of the Clinton Administration, discusses these 
principles, drawing both on his practical experience in government and his 
broader intellectual background with respect to these issues.  In reviewing his 
essay, I will focus on two of these principles, amplifying key points he made. 
 
* Executive Director of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights since 1978, the year the 
organization was founded; J.D., University of California Law School (Boalt Hall) (1975); B.A., 
History, with distinction and honors, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (1972). 
 1. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 304 (2002). 
 2. Id. at 295. 
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I.  TELLING THE TRUTH 
Professor Koh writes that telling the truth is the “first and most important 
task” for the U.S. government in carrying out its human rights policies.3  He 
rightly focuses on the annual State Department Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices, which he says “now form the heart of U.S. human rights 
policy.”4  As he describes, these reports provide an official information base 
upon which policy judgments can be made.  Yet the history of these reports 
suggests the importance of outside vigilance and scrutiny, both in the 
preparatory process and the reports’ content. 
The Country Reports were first prepared in 1976, pursuant to a 
congressional mandate.  The first volume, covering eighty-two countries that 
received U.S. military aid, was sent only to Congress; it was not intended for 
public release.  It contained many inaccuracies and factual distortions.  Private 
groups filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit to secure its public release.  
They prevailed, and as a result the 143-page report eventually was made 
public.  The report drew instant attention, including criticism from those who 
saw it as harmful to U.S. policy interests, in part because it covered only U.S. 
allies receiving military aid.  The State Department expanded the reports in 
response to this criticism and within two years the Country Reports had grown 
to include 154 countries, and were over 850 pages, more than five times the 
length of the initial report.5  Last year’s report covered 194 countries.  For 
sixteen years, beginning in 1982, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
published an annual critique of selected chapters of the Country Reports in an 
effort to address the political biases in the reporting process, which too often 
resulted in omissions and distortions of fact.6  In the early 1980’s, the Lawyers 
Committee’s critiques were particularly critical of the chapters on Central 
American countries that were key U.S. allies, particularly El Salvador.7  In 
1988, the Lawyers Committee took a broader look at the reporting process, 
conducting extensive interviews with State Department officials in a broader 
effort to strengthen the reporting process.8 
 
 3. Id. at 306. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Michael E. Parmly, Introduction, in DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 
2000 [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 2000], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 
2000/648.htm (released Feb. 23, 2001); DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1979 (1980). 
 6. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A CRITIQUE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE’S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (1982-1997). 
 7. Id. 
 8. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1988 PROJECT SERIES NO. 4, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: BUREAUCRACY AND DIPLOMACY (1989). 
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Over time, these efforts by the Lawyers Committee and other non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) made a significant difference, and, as 
Professor Koh suggests, the State Department’s reporting improved 
dramatically.  It improved so markedly that in 1998 the decision was made to 
discontinue publication of the annual critique.  There are areas, however, 
where the scope and content of the Country Reports need to be re-evaluated 
and refined.  One prominent area is with respect to the human rights of 
workers, which is an important element of the evolving effort to enforce 
economic and social rights.  The reports currently include sections on the right 
of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, prohibition on 
forced labor, the status of child labor, and other acceptable conditions of work.  
The reporting on each of these points could be more detailed, and additional 
sections could be added.  There could, for example, be a section on workplace 
health and safety, which would provide information on local government laws 
and enforcement procedures with respect to these important rights. 
But challenges also remain in maintaining the high quality and reliability 
of the Country Reports, especially as comparisons with recent changes in U.S. 
law and procedures after September 11 become more striking.  One issue that 
is likely to draw unprecedented attention in the future is the State Department’s 
reporting on military tribunals or state security courts in countries like Egypt, 
Columbia, Peru and Turkey.  This interest will arise in light of the Executive 
Order signed by President Bush in November 2001 authorizing the use of 
similar Military Commissions in the United States.9  The State Department’s 
most recent report on Peru, for example, included an analysis of the case of 
Lori Berenson, a U.S. citizen who was tried for terrorism in a military tribunal 
in Peru.10  The State Department concludes that she was tried “without 
sufficient guarantees of due process.”11  The report goes on to say: 
Proceedings in these military courts—and those for terrorism in civilian 
courts—do not meet internationally accepted standards of openness, fairness, 
and due process.  Military courts hold treason trials in secret.  Such secrecy is 
not required legally, but in some cases the courts deem that circumstances 
require it.  Defense attorneys in treason trials are not permitted adequate access 
to the files containing the State’s evidence against their clients, nor are they 
allowed to question police or military witnesses either before or during the 
trial.12 
 
 9. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 10. Peru, in COUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 5, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ 
rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/827.htm (released Feb. 23, 2001). 
 11. Id. §e (Denial of Fair Public Trial). 
 12. Id. 
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In this and other country chapters, the world will be watching closely to see 
whether the State Department’s criticisms in future Country Reports are muted, 
to avoid negative comparisons to the U.S. government’s own handling of this 
issue. 
Professor Koh rightly says that it is equally important for the U.S. 
government to report on our own human rights conditions.  The State 
Department has no mandate to do this as part of the Country Reports.  
However, the U.S. government does have a regular reporting obligation to the 
United Nations as a party to three international treaties: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention Against Torture.13  
Each of these treaties obligates the U.S. government to submit periodic reports 
describing legislative, judicial, administrative and other measures to give effect 
to those rights. 
The U.S. government submitted its first ever periodic report on human 
rights to the United Nations (U.N.) in 1994.  It assessed U.S. compliance with 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Unfortunately, this 
report focused almost exclusively on the protections afforded by the letter of 
U.S. law, rather than focusing on whether treaty standards are met in practice.  
There are a number of important areas where such violations continue to occur; 
these include: 1) conditions of detention in many federal and state prisons that 
do not meet treaty standards; 2) improper practices by law enforcement 
officials including use of excessive force; and 3) racial profiling in policing 
and other differences in treatment between races in the criminal justice 
system.14 
While some initial efforts have been made by U.S. officials to publicize 
U.S. ratification of these human rights treaties, the compliance reports are not 
widely disseminated and receive very little public attention.  In addition, there 
have not been adequate efforts to involve appropriate state and local officials 
in the reporting process, even though many of the most troubling violations 
occur at the local level.15  In this regard it would be useful, for example, for the 
federal government to work with the National Association of Attorneys 
 
 13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], adopted Dec. 
19, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination [hereinafter CERD], opened for signature Mar. 7, 1996, 660 U.N.T.S. 212; 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
[hereinafter CAT], June 26, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988); LAWYERS COMMITTEE 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Human Rights in the United States: Domestic Implementation of Treaty 
Obligations, in IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: 1996 QUADRENNIAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 61 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 QUADRENNIAL REPORT]. 
 14. 1996 QUADRENNIAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 61-68. 
 15. Id. 
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General, the National Governors Association and other similar state and local 
organizations whose offices might effectively contribute to this process. 
The U.S. government needs to put a higher premium on telling the truth 
about human rights in the United States and in taking concrete steps to improve 
U.S. rights performance accordingly.  As the Lawyers Committee has urged in 
recent reports to new Presidential administrations, a strong record of U.S. 
compliance with international human rights standards is an essential 
underpinning for our ability to press concerns about abuses elsewhere.16  When 
confronted by the United States and others, governments with poor human 
rights records often try to turn the tables and charge their accusers with 
violations of human rights. 
A systematic effort to put America’s own house in order would help the 
United States rebut such charges and keep the pressure on countries where 
abuse is egregious.  United States criticism of other governments rests on the 
principle of the international rule of law—a clear set of norms that apply to all 
nations.  To preserve its credibility in criticizing others, the United States must 
be willing to be held fully accountable to those same norms. 
By any reasonable measure, the United State’s overall human rights record 
is exemplary.  The American Constitution and legal system are sources of 
understandable pride.  The international human rights system bears to a great 
extent the mark of American models and authorship. 
Yet no government or society is perfect, and there are areas in which the 
United States lags behind international standards of rights protection.  There is 
a wide gulf between the U.S. record of respect for human rights and the record 
of those whom we criticize.  An acknowledgment of our own flaws is more 
credible than a defensive posture and could only heighten the contrast. 
For example, racial discrimination in our justice system, particularly in the 
administration of the death penalty, is one such problem area. There has also 
been a clear pattern of racial profiling in some state and local police forces. 
And some American prisons have been the site of abuse against women, 
including sexual harassment and rape of women prisoners by corrections 
staff.17 
These and similar problems in law and practice should be identified and 
the obstacles to progress should be honestly addressed.  The defense of the 
U.S. record in international forums should be a balanced one that reflects 
reality. A strongly self-protective stance would only contribute to a perception 
that America sees itself as above the law.  The United States has more to gain 
 
 16. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST 2001: HUMAN 
RIGHTS POLICIES FOR THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 108 (2001) [hereinafter BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION POLICIES].  See also 1996 QUADRENNIAL REPORT, supra note 13. 
 17. BUSH ADMINISTRATION POLICIES, supra note 16, at 109-10. 
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from presenting a frank assessment of its flaws and how it is being addressed 
than by denying its existence. 
One area where the U.S. government can go further is in its prosecution of 
torture, including both acts of torture abroad and those committed within the 
United States.  As part of the implementation process, in connection with the 
U.S. ratification of the Torture Convention, the United States passed a federal 
statute which grants criminal jurisdiction to U.S. federal courts for acts of 
torture committed outside of the United States if the suspected torturer is 
physically present in the United States.18  However, this statute has yet to be 
utilized.  In one case, involving a Peruvian military officer named Anderson 
Kohatsu, the State Department apparently intervened to discourage federal 
prosecution.19  In the future, such cases should be prosecuted as part of a 
broader global effort to develop an international system of accountability for 
the most serious human rights crimes. 
This federal statute should also be expanded to include acts of torture 
committed inside the United States, which could be applied in cases like the 
brutalization of Abner Louima in New York, a case Professor Koh mentions in 
his article.20  Legislation expanding the scope of the federal Torture Statute has 
been introduced in Congress and is now pending.21  Its adoption should be a 
priority for rights advocates. 
II.  INSIDE-OUTSIDE:  ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Professor Koh’s third principle is consistency toward the present.  Here he 
applies what he calls the technique of inside-outside engagement to apply 
pressure to countries that violate human rights.  An important element of this 
strategy relates to the private sector, particularly multinational corporations 
 
 18. Id. at 115. 
 19. The following passage demonstrates the State Department’s involvement: 
In March 2000, for instance, Ricardo Anderson Kohatsu, a Peruvian intelligence officer 
accused of vicious torture, was sent by the Peruvian government to testify to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in Washington, D.C. When NGO’s denounced 
his presence and presented credible evidence, U.S. law enforcement officials detained him 
as he was about to leave the country.  However, the State Department intervened to free 
Kohatsu on the questionable pretext that he was entitled to immunity under the 
headquarters agreement between the U.S. and the Organization of American States. 
Reed Brody, The Prosecution of Hissene Habre—An “African Pinochet,” 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
321, 334-35 (2001). 
 20. Koh, supra note 1, at 308-09. 
 21. The federal statute that was passed in 1994 is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.  The 
legislation is a bill introduced by Representative Maxine Waters, H.R. 3158.  E-mail from Elisa 
Massimino, Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, to Mike Posner, Executive 
Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (Feb. 25, 2002, 6:26pm) (on file with Saint 
Louis University Law Journal). 
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that rely on global supply chains and global markets.22  His hypothesis is that 
U.S. government engagement with these multinational corporations can be “a 
potent way to promote global human rights.”23 
He argues that a key to this strategy is demonstrating that “corporate social 
responsibility in human rights is not just good, but also good for business in at 
least four ways.”24  He asserts that corporate social responsibility: 1) 
strengthens the rule of law and the capacity of civil society organizations; 2) 
increases the opportunity for dialogue between corporations and local civil 
society, giving local groups a greater stake in the foreign corporation’s 
financial success; 3) enhances corporate reputation among NGOs, consumers 
and the media; and 4) diminishes security risks.25 
While this may be a useful way to frame initial conversations with global 
companies, it is essential for rights advocates to take concrete steps to put 
corporate social responsibility into practice.  This will require multiple efforts 
to create greater corporate transparency and accountability.  Achieving these 
objectives will not come easily.  And neither of the two human rights 
partnerships Professor Koh mentions, the U.N.’s Global Compact or the Global 
Sullivan Principles, has yet demonstrated meaningful breakthroughs in terms 
of either transparency or accountability.26 
In the last decade, many multinational companies, especially those in 
labor-intensive, low-wage industries, such as apparel and toys, have moved 
their manufacturing bases abroad.  They rely on a global network of 
contractors and suppliers who operate largely in less developed countries in 
Asia and Latin America.  In these regions, violations of internationally 
recognized labor rights are commonplace, including the use of child labor, 
forced labor, discrimination in the workplace, onerous overtime requirements, 
infringement of local wage law and inadequate health and safety protections.  
In this environment, there is a need for the enforcement of international labor 
standards to ensure that workers who manufacture products in the global 
marketplace are treated with dignity and respect.  This can be achieved most 
readily today by holding global manufacturers accountable for upholding basic 
labor rights among all of their principle suppliers and contractors. 
In the absence of new and effective means of international and national 
enforcement mechanisms, multinational corporations are left to voluntarily 
police themselves.  Until recently, almost all global manufacturers took the 
view that they bore no responsibility for working conditions in the factories of 
their suppliers or contractors. Gradually, this view is changing, driven, in part, 
 
 22. Koh, supra note 1, at 319-20. 
 23. Id. at 320. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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by increased media attention and the resultant consumer pressure. In the last 
ten years, this has forced many global manufacturers to adopt internal codes of 
conduct, which address child labor, workplace health and safety conditions, 
wage and overtime issues, discrimination and other persistent problems.  
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), there are now some 246 codes of corporate conduct in existence.27  
While this movement has served as a catalyst for new voluntary workplace 
codes of conduct, these codes vary widely in the degree to which they are 
enforced, monitored and, ultimately, provide meaningful protection to the 
workers themselves. 
Many of these efforts, undertaken in most cases by individual companies, 
demand not only stricter self-regulation but also monitoring of workplace 
conditions by “independent experts.”  To some, this may be seen as 
unnecessarily privatizing the enforcement of labor rights—a role traditionally 
performed by government. Unfortunately, many governments have 
demonstrated a lack of capacity, and often the will, to enforce such rights.  
Even in the United States, effective regulation and protection of workers has 
been eroded at the low-wage end of the labor market.  “Sweatshops” are a 
global phenomenon.  As a result, voluntary multi-stakeholder enforcement 
mechanisms—focusing primarily on workplace monitoring—are developing. 
One evolving model for creating greater transparency and accountability 
for workers is the Fair Labor Association (FLA), which the U.S. government 
helped to initiate as part of its Anti-Sweatshop Initiative, which Professor Koh 
mentions.  In 1996, in an effort to end sweatshop conditions in the manufacture 
of apparel and footwear around the world, President Clinton brought together 
an informal group of apparel and footwear companies, unions and human 
rights, labor rights and consumer organizations (including the Lawyers 
Committee), called the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP). Through the AIP, 
these disparate groups developed an industry-wide code of conduct and 
monitoring principles aimed at establishing a common industry standard to 
enforce labor rights. 
In November 1998, a number of the AIP partners formed the FLA.28  Key 
provisions of the FLA agreement and its Workplace Code of Conduct call for 
elimination in the workplace of forced and child labor, harassment, abuse and 
discrimination.29  The code also enforces health and safety standards, 
recognizes the right of employees to freedom of association and collective 
 
 27. Gary Gereffi et al., The NGO-Industrial Complex, FOREIGN POL’Y, July/Aug. 2001, at 
57. 
 28. For more information on the Fair Labor Association, see the FLA website at 
http://www.fairlabor.org. 
 29. Id. at Workplace Code of Conduct, http://www.fairlabor.org/html/CodeOfConduct/ 
index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2002). 
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bargaining, sets wage standards, imposes limitations on work hours and 
establishes requirements regarding overtime compensation.30  The FLA 
accredits monitors (including NGOs) to conduct independent inspections of 
factories.  Eventually it will evaluate companies for compliance with its code 
and monitoring standards and serve as a source of information for the public 
about working conditions. 
This rapid movement towards the development and enforcement of 
voluntary workplace standards is a relatively recent and untested phenomenon 
with many issues still to be resolved.31  However, it is clear that any 
developments they engender toward increased transparency and 
accountability—whether it is for companies, governments or other 
stakeholders—are key in ensuring sustainable improvements.  Monitoring 
systems will be most effective in the long-term if they involve local unions and 
other organizations and individuals who are most intimately familiar with the 
everyday problems faced by workers.  In many places, however, trade unions 
are prohibited or restricted and there are a limited number of other local 
organizations ready and able to assume this role.  Consequently, assistance in 
developing such capacity is needed.  Monitoring the enforcement of rights 
must be sustained over an extended period of time; there is no quick fix or easy 
solution to improving factory conditions.  Ad hoc factory exposés are a useful 
tool in highlighting the problems but are not the most effective mechanism for 
ensuring long-term global change.  Improved worker and management 
education and training is also key to the long-term enforcement of rights.  Not 
only government, but consumers, unions, NGOs and companies all have an 
essential role to play in supporting the rights of workers around the world. 
Beyond support for such voluntary public-private initiatives, the 
government also has an important role to play in using the technique of inside-
outside engagement that Professor Koh describes to put increased pressure for 
reform on countries that violate human rights.  One means of doing this is to 
focus on the long-term benefits of explicitly linking trade benefits to improved 
human rights conditions, particularly working conditions.  Tentative steps were 
taken in this direction by the Clinton Administration in 1999 with the 
development of a textile quota agreement with Cambodia, which requires the 
Cambodian government to improve labor conditions in order to be able to 
increase exports of garments to the United States.32  The early signs are 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Other initiatives currently being developed in this field, which focus on improving 
workplace conditions, include the European Ethical Trading Initiative, Social Accountability 
International and the university students’ Workers Rights Consortium. 
 32. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE: U.S. AND CAMBODIA REACH 
BILATERAL TEXTILE AGREEMENT, Jan. 21, 1999, at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/asia-pacific/ 
releases.shtml.  The “United States and Cambodia have agreed to extend their Bilateral Textile 
Agreement for an additional three years, through December 31, 2004.”  Press Release, Office of 
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encouraging that this has opened the door to a constructive workers’ rights 
debate within the country. 
However, such direct links between trade and labor are rare in U.S. trade 
history, and the recent passage of trade promotion authority by the House (by a 
one-vote margin) signals that they may become even rarer.33  Trade promotion 
authority, formerly known as “fast track,” grants the President greater authority 
to negotiate trade deals—such as expansion of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement—without having their terms negotiated by Congress. While open 
markets and expanded trade can indeed benefit many, the divide between the 
rhetoric and the reality is widening.34  Trade can and should be a key element 
in encouraging greater compliance with human rights, but the expansion of 
trading rights must not be at the expense of those who need it most. 
 
 
the United States Trade Representative, U.S.-Cambodian Textile Agreement Links Increasing 
Trade with Improving Workers’ Rights, at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/01/02-03.htm (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2002). 
 33. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, H.R. Res. 306, 107th Cong., 147 
CONG. REC. H8972-02 (2001) (enacted), available at 2001 WL 1555768. 
 34. The one-vote victory for trade promotion authority resulted in part from promises by the 
White House of separate protectionist measures, such as limits on apparel and textile imports 
from Caribbean and Latin American countries that effectively grant benefits to one region while 
taking from another.  Joseph Kahn, Wheeling, Dealing and Making Side Deals; Vow to Scrap 
Latin Textile Deals Wins Vote on Bush Trade Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2001, at C1. 
